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The EM Side-Channel(s)
Written by:
Dakshi Agrawal,
Bruce Archambeault,
Josyula R Rao,
and
Pankaj Rohatgi.
Citation:
Proceedings of Workshop on cryptographic hardware and embedded systems, CHES 2002, LNCS 2523, pp. 29-45, 2002.
Copyright © (2002) by Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
Abstract:
We present results of a systematic investigation of leakage of
compromising information via electromagnetic (EM) emanations from CMOS
devices. These emanations are shown to consist of a multiplicity of
signals, each leaking somewhat different information
about the underlying computation. We show that not only can EM
emanations be used to attack cryptographic devices where the power
side--channel is unavailable, they can even be used to break power
analysis countermeasures.
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United States
