We consider three pricing strategies, each of which makes very different demands on the required level of informational and computational power of agents:
pricing
strategy [Kephart et al.
1998] uses information about all the buyer characteristics that factor
into the buyer demand function, as well as the competitors' prices,
but makes no attempt to account for competitors' pricing strategies.
Instead, it is based on the assumption of static expectations: even
if one seller is contemplating a price change under myoptimal
pricing, this seller does not assume that this will elicit a
response from its competitors; instead it assumes that competitors'
prices will remain fixed.
The myoptimal seller uses all of the available information and
the assumption of static expectations to perform an exhaustive
search for the price
that maximizes its expected profit
. In our simulations, we compute
according to
Eqs. 7 and 8. The
optimal price
is guaranteed to be either the valuation v
or
below some competitor's price, where
is the
price quantum, or the smallest amount by which one seller may
undercut another, set to 0.002 in these simulations. This limits
the search for
to S possible values.