...quotes.

We permit a search strategy of 0 to allow buyers to opt out of the market entirely, which may be desirable if search costs are prohibitive.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

...54#54

If 55#55, then the unique Nash equilibrium is such that all sellers charge the monopoly price v; if 56#56, then the unique Nash equilibrium is such that all sellers charge the competitive price r (see [8, 9]).

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

...and

In Eq. 2, 66#66 is expressed as a function of seller s's scalar price p, given that probability distribution F(p) describes the other sellers' expected prices.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

...f(p). 

This depends on the assumption that 14#14 is sufficiently small such that 130#130. Otherwise, the equilibria which arise are such that 131#131 or 132#132.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

...dispersion. 

We mention only a handful of papers that make up this large body of literature, but refer the reader to the bibliography included in Hopkins and Seymour [11] for additional sources.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.